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I. THE GOLDEN AGE OF PATENTS

We are witnessing the sunset of the golden age of patents. Just as
technology stocks experienced a meteoric rise in value during the bull
market of the 1990s, such is the current state of patents.' In recent times,
rapidly developing technologies were hastily shoehorned into patent
protection for which they were poorly fitted.2 Prime examples include
business methods and software, both of which are considered by some
experts as ill-suited for protection under principles of patent law.
Nevertheless, they currently qualify as patentable subject matter. In
addition to the enlarged scope of patentable subject matter, corporations
and other business enterprises increasingly focused their business models
around patent portfolios. These patents and intellectual property portfolios
currently account for a historically disproportionate percentage of many
companies' assets.4 But just as the pendulum of the stock market swings
from irrational exuberance to unjustifiable pessimism, and sooner or later
all bull markets end badly, the patent "market" is long overdue for a severe
correction.' Recent actions of both the legislature and judiciary portend
such imminent changes in patent law.
Recently, both the Senate and House of Representatives had before
them legislation known as the Patent Reform Act of 2007.6 The concept of
patent reform, however, is not a recent phenomenon. Similar legislation
was previously introduced as the Patent Reform Act of 20057 and the

1. During the 1990s people got especially carried away on technology and Internet stocks,
believing that the industry would outgrow all others forever. BENJAMIN GRAHAM & JASON ZWEIG,
THE INTELLIGENT INVESTOR 15 (Harper Collins Publishers 2006) (1949).
2. See State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir.
1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1093 (1999) (holding that the transformation of data by a machine
through a series of mathematical calculations producing a useful, concrete, and tangible result
constitutes a practical application of a mathematical algorithm, and the mere fact that a claimed
invention involves inputting numbers, calculating numbers, outputting numbers, and storing
numbers, in and of itself, does not render it nonstatutory subject matter). State Street opened the
floodgates for both software and business method patents. See id. at 1377.
3. See id.
4. Tangible assets include a company's physical property, such as real estate, factories,
equipment, and inventories, as well as its financial balances, such as cash, short-term investments,
and accounts receivable. GRAHAM & ZWEIG, supra note 1, at 9. Soft assets include patents,
trademarks, copyrights, trade secrets, goodwill, and other intangibles. Id. A company's total assets
consist of its tangible assets and its soft assets. Id. at 198.
5. The bull market of the 1990s ended quite dramatically. The period between March 2000
and October 2002 constituted the greatest market crash since the great depression, with U.S. stocks
loosing 50.5% of their value, or 7.4 trillion dollars. Id. at 14.
6. S. 1145, 110th Cong. (1st Sess. 2007); H.R. 1908, 110th Cong. (1st Sess. 2007).
7. H.R. 2795, 109th Cong. (1st Sess. 2005).
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Patent Reform Act of 2006.8 Included in the 2007 reform effort were
provisions seeking to institute a first-to-file priority system and eliminate
interference proceedings, limit patent damages to the economic value of
the improvement as compared to the prior art, limit trebling of damages for
willful infringement, institute post-grant opposition proceedings, create a
new patent trial and appeal board, and provide for greater third party
rights.9 In combination, these provisions would reduce the value of patents
in general and allow for easier challenges to existing patents, resulting in
more inventions and technology falling into the public domain.
The judiciary was also a party to this trend. Evincing an increased
willingness to intervene in issues of patent law, the Supreme Court of the
United States decided two notable patent cases during its October 2005
term. In Illinois Tool Works Inc. v. Independent Ink, Inc.l° the Court
established that patents do not create a presumption of market power in a
tying arrangement under the antitrust laws. 1 The second case was eBay,
Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C.,' 2 which vacated the existing standard for
granting permanent injunctions in patent cases and implemented a fourfactor balancing test.' 3
During the October 2006 session, the Supreme Court exceeded the
previous year's judicial effort, granting certiorari for three crucial patent
law cases. All three cases would become landmark decisions and alter the
landscape of patent law by weakening available protections. The Court
first entertained oral arguments in MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc. 4
and subsequently ruled that patent licensees are not required to materially
breach license agreements prior to challenging the underlying patent via
the Declaratory Judgment Act.' 5 Next, the Court addressed the standard for
non-obviousness in KSR InternationalCo. v. Teleflex, Inc. 6Discarding the
rigid teaching-suggestion-motivation test for inventions combining
elements of preexisting inventions, the Court raised the standard of non-

8. S. 3818, 109th Cong. (2d Sess. 2006).
9. Supra note 6.
10. 547 U.S. 28 (2006). Illinois Tool Works, Inc. manufactured and marketed patented
printing systems, and Independent Ink, Inc. developed ink with the same chemical composition as
the ink sold by Illinois Tool Works. Id. at 31-32. After an unsuccessful infringement action
Independent Ink filed a complaint alleging antitrust violations. Id. at 32.
11. Id. at 44-46.
12. 126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006). MercExchange owned a patent for a method of conducting online
sales and sued eBay for infringement, but was denied relief of a permanent injunction. Id. at 1839.
13. Id. at 1841.
14. 127 S. Ct. 764 (2007).
15. Id. at 776-77.
16. 127 S. Ct. 1727 (2007).
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obviousness and established a flexible and expansive fact intensive
approach.17
The least heralded of the trio was Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp.i The
Supreme Court accepted certiorari only after asking the Office of the
Solicitor for its opinion on the matter. The case primarily involved issues
regarding the extraterritorial reach of patent law that were originally
addressed by the Supreme Court in Deepsouth Packaging Co., Inc. v.
Laitram Corp. 9 The Deepsouth decision created a loophole in the regime
of patent protection, which required a legislative patch.2" Microsoft
presented a contemporary variation of the Deepsouth problem, posing a
question of the extraterritorial reach of U.S. patent law with regard to
software components.2 Though Microsoft was given the least attention of
the 2006 patent cases, the Supreme Court's decision is a harbinger of the
future of patent law.
II. THE DEEPSOUTH LOOPHOLE
The Supreme Court first addressed a situation involving the export of
component parts of a patented invention in Deepsouth.22 Laitram, holder
of a patent for a shrimp-deveining machine, sued Deepsouth, the
manufacturer of an infringing deveiner. 23 Deepsouth conceded that section
27124 barred it from making and selling its deveining machine in the
United States. 25 However, Deepsouth sought to salvage a portion of its
business and shipped the component parts of the shrimp-deveining
machine abroad for assembly by its foreign customers. 26 Deepsouth argued

17. Id. at 1745-46.
18. 127 S. Ct. 1746 (2007).
19. 406 U.S. 518 (1972).
20. Id. at 530-32.
21. Microsoft, 127 S. Ct. at 1750-51.
22. Deepsouth, 406 U.S. at 523.
23. Id. at 524.
24. 35 U.S.C. § 27 1(a). All statutory sections hereinafter referred to are located in title 35 of
the U.S. Code.
25. Deepsouth, 406 U.S. at 523.
26. Id. Deepsouth was entirely forthright in indicating that its course of conduct was
motivated by a desire to avoid infringing Laitram's patent. Id. at 524. Deepsouth's president
indicated as much to his foreign customers as follows:
We are handicapped by a decision against us in the United States. This was a very
technical decision and we can manufacture the entire machine without any
complication in the United States, with the exception that there are two parts that
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that it avoided infringing Laitram's patent by manufacturing and exporting
the unassembled component parts of the deveiner for assembly and use
abroad.27
The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari to consider
whether Deepsouth, in addition to being barred from the U.S. market by
Laitram's patent, was also precluded from exporting the unassembled
component parts of its deveiners for assembly and use abroad.28 The Court
noted that if Deepsouth's conduct was intended to lead to use of patented
deveiners inside the United States, its manufacturing and sales activity
would constitute induced or contributory infringement. 9 However, the
Court observed that settled law established that contributory infringement
cannot exist without actual or intended direct infringement.3 °
Construing the statutory text of section 271, the Supreme Court
recognized that making or using a patented product outside the United
States does not constitute infringement.3 ' Therefore, Deepsouth was not
liable as a direct infringer because it did not make, use, or sell the fully
assembled deveining machine within the United States.32 Neither did
foreign buyers of the deveining machines infringe Laitram's patent
because the unassembled machine was sold to foreign entities, and it was
assembled and used outside of the United States.33 Accordingly, the Court
concluded that Deepsouth was not liable for direct or contributory
infringement.34
Thus, the Supreme Court's ruling in Deepsouth created a gaping hole
in patent protection. Manufacturers easily escaped direct and contributory
infringement simply by exporting unassembled component parts of
inventions covered by U.S. patents. Eight years after the Deepsouth
decision, Congress addressed this loophole by amending the patent laws.

must not be assembled in the United States, but assembled after the machine
arrives...
Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 519.
29. Id. at 526.
30. Deepsouth, 406 U.S. at 526.
31. Id. at 527.
32. See id. The Court relied on prior decisions holding that "a combination patent protects
only against the operable assembly ofthe whole and not the manufacture of its parts." Id.at 528-29.
Hence, the export of the unassembled parts did not amount to infringement of Laitram's patent. See
id.
33. See id.

34. Id. at 532.
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III. LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL RESPONSE: ENACTING § 271(f)
In the Patent Law Amendments Act of 1984, 35 Congress directly
responded to the Deepsouth problem by adding section 271(f), thereby
making the export ofunassembled components of an invention covered by
a U.S patent a distinct act of infringement.3 6 The new section 271 (f) read
as follows:
(1) Whoever without authority supplies or causes to be supplied in
or from the United States all or a substantial portion of the
components of a patented invention, where such components are
uncombined in whole or in part, in such manner as to actively
induce the combination of such components outside of the United
States in a manner that would infringe the patent if such
combination occurred within the United States, shall be liable as an
infringer.
(2) Whoever without authority supplies or causes to be supplied in
or from the United States any component of a patented invention
that is especially made or especially adapted for use in the invention
and not a staple article or commodity of commerce suitable for
substantial noninfringing use, where such component is
uncombined in whole or in part, knowing that such component is so
made or adapted and intending that such component will be
combined outside of the United States in a manner that would
infringe the patent if such combination occurred within the United
States, shall be liable as an infringer.37
According to the legislative history, through section 271(f), Congress
intended to prevent unauthorized manufacturers from avoiding U.S.
patents by exporting components of a patented product for assembly
abroad.38 Thus, Congress sought to close the loophole opened by the
Supreme Court ruling in Deepsouth.39

35. H.R. 6286, 98th Cong. 1984 (enacted). The Patent Law Amendments Act also included
a definition of joint inventorship. Id. Prior to the 1984 amendment, 35 U.S.C. § 116 recognized
joint inventorship, but did not define it. See id.
36. 35 U.S.C. § 271(f) (2003).
37. Id.
38. Pellegrini v. Analog Devices, Inc., 375 F.3d 1113, 1116 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
39. Id.
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Under section 271 (f), supplying components of a patented invention for
combination or assembly outside the United States constitutes
infringement of the U.S. patent. 40 The section also includes elements of
contributory infringement by incorporating acts that merely cause
components to be supplied for foreign combination with acts that "actively
induce" such combination. 4' The term "actively induce" was drawn from
section 271(b), which provides that whoever actively induces patent
infringement is liable as an infringer. 42 "Active inducement" is applicable
if the foreign assembly is under the direct control of the supplier, or
carried out pursuant to supplier's express instructions, as was the case in
Deepsouth.43 The legislative history of section 271(f)(1) suggests that
inclusion of "active inducement" was intended to broaden the scope of
liability, extending it to cover both those who actually supply the
components and contributory infringers who cause others to supply
components." The concept of "active inducement" is governed by
standards developed under section 271(b). 45 To be liable as an infringer
under section 271 (f)(1), all or a substantial portion of the components must
be supplied and combined in a manner infringing the patent if it occurred
within the United States.46
Notably, both section 271 (f)(1) and (f)(2) refer to "component[s] of a
patented invention."' The wording differs from section 271(c), which
refers to components of machines, manufactures, combinations,
compositions, and "material or apparatus for use in practicing a patented
process."4' Because section 271(f) is not limited in such a manner, it

40. 35 U.S.C. § 271(f) (2003).
41. Id.
42. 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) (2003). Cf 35 U.S.C. § 271(f) (2003).
43. See Deepsouth Packaging Co., Inc. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 523 n.5 (1972).
44. T.D. Williamson, Inc. v. Laymon, 723 F. Supp. 587, 591-92 (N.D. Okla. 1989).
45. 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) (2003) (providing that "whoever actively induces infringement of a
patent shall be liable as an infringer"). A person may infringe a patent by actively and knowingly
aiding and abetting another's direct infringement ofthe patent. See Nat'l Presto Indus., Inc. v. West
Bend Co., 76 F.3d 1185, 1194-95 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (holding that "statutory liability for inducement
of infringement derives from the common law, wherein acts that the actor knows will lead to the
commission of a wrong by another, place shared liability for the wrong on the actor"). The relevant
statutory language of§ 271(f)(1) is "whoever... causes to be supplied.. . in such a manner as to
actively induce the combination of such components..." 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(1) (emphasis added).
46. 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(1) (2003).
47. 35 U.S.C. § 271(f) (2003).
48. 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (2003). Section 271(c)'s application to export of components is
restricted by the rule that "there can be no contributory infringement in the absence of a direct
infringement." Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 365 U.S. 336, 341-42 (1961).
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appears to include components used in carrying out a patented process
abroad.49
Under section 271(f)(1), components may be staple articles of
commerce also suitable for substantial noninfringing uses, but under
section 271 (f)(2), components must be especially made or adapted for use
in a particular invention. ° The text in section 271 (0(2) reading "especially
adapted for use in the invention and not a staple article or commodity of
commerce suitable for substantial noninfringing use" was derived from
section 271 (c), which governs contributory infringement.5' Under section
271(f)(2), export of an "especially adapted" component suffices if the
export supplier knows that the component is specially adapted, and intends
for the component to be combined abroad in the patented invention.52
Determinations of whether a component is "especially adapted" and
whether the supplier possesses requisite knowledge are governed by the
applicable standards under section 27 1(c).53
While section 27 1(f) responded to the Deepsouth problem, it ventured
beyond a mere reversal of the decision. In Deepsouth, the defendant
produced all of the parts of the patented shrimp deveiner and shipped them
abroad for assembly according to the defendant's instructions. As written,
section 271(f) clearly applies to such a situation under the "active
inducement" provision.5 4 Section 27 1(f) goes beyond the circumstances
presented in Deepsouth, and prohibits exportation of even a "substantial
portion" of the component parts of a patented invention.55 Export of "a
substantial portion of the components" constitutes infringement under

49. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(f) (2003).
50. 35 U.S.C. § 271(f) (2003).
51. 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(2) (2003). Cf. 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (2003).
52. Pellegrini v. Analog Devices, Inc., 375 F.3d 1113, 1116 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
53. 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (2003) (covering the situation in which contributory infringement
arises through the sale of a component specially designed for use in a patented product or process).
35 U.S.C. § 271(c) provides:
Whoever offers to sell or sells within the United States or imports into the United
States a component of a patented machine, manufacture, combination or
composition, or a material or apparatus for use in practicing a patented process,
constituting a material part of the invention, knowing the same to be especially
made or especially adapted for use in an infringement of such patent, and not a
staple article or commodity of commerce suitable for substantial noninfiringing
use, shall be liable as a contributory infringer.
Id.
54. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(f) (2003).
55. 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(1) (2003).
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section 271 (f)(1) if the exporter actively induces assembly of the entire
combination abroad.56 However, exporting less then a "substantial portion"
of components does not constitute infringement. The determination of
what constitutes a "substantial portion" of a given invention is a question
of fact subject to judicial interpretation similar to the interpretation of what
qualifies as a "component."
IV. MICROSOFT V.AT& T

A. The Majority Opinion
In Microsoft v. AT&T, the Supreme Court considered a modem
permutation of the circumstances originally presented in Deepsouth 7
Microsoft generated the software code for its Windows operating system
in the United States and sold the Windows operating system software to
computer manufacturers, both foreign and domestic." Microsoft licensed
its Windows software to foreign computer manufacturers and charged a
licensing fee for each of the millions of copies installed onto computers. 9
For distribution, Microsoft encoded the Windows software onto CDROMs known as "golden masters."6' The golden masters were then
shipped abroad, or the software code was transmitted overseas via
encrypted electronic transmission. 6' Foreign manufacturers used the
golden masters of the software to generate second generation copies on
other disks used to install the Windows software on foreign-manufactured
computers.62 Microsoft also distributed Windows software to the foreign
manufacturers indirectly, by sending golden master disks to authorized
foreign replicators for copying and distribution to manufacturers.63 Only
copies of the Windows golden masters, not the golden masters themselves,
were installed on foreign manufacturers' computers.' No physical aspect

56.
57.
58.
59.
186523.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(1) (2003).
Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 127 S. Ct. 1746, 1750-51 (2007).
Id.at 1752-53.
Brief of Respondent at 8-9, Microsoft, 127 S. Ct 1746 (2007) (No. 05-1056), 2007 WL
Microsoft, 127 S.Ct. at 1761.
Id.at 1753.
Id.at 1750.
Id.at 1753 n.4.
Id.at 1753.
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of an original Windows golden master was ever incorporated into the
foreign-manufactured computers.65
In 1981, employees of Bell Laboratories filed a patent application for
a "Digital Speech Coder," which would eventually become vital to the
international telecommunications industry and an integral part of the daily
lives of the majority of the world's population.66 The claimed system was
adopted as a standard by the International Telecommunications Union and
remains widely used in devices such as mobile phones, computers,
videoconferencing software, and other speech transmission applications.67
The claimed voice compression system converts analog audio signals into
digital signals, thereby reducing the amount of information necessary to
transmit the audio signal while maintaining the quality of the signal.68
AT&T, which owned Bell Laboratories at the time, received U.S. Patent
No. 4,472,832 for the system.69 The patent covers an apparatus combining
the software code and a general-purpose computer in a system that
compresses speech.7" The patent expired in 2001.7
In 2001, AT&T filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of New York charging Microsoft with patent
infringement and inducement of infringement for domestic and foreign
installations of the Windows operating system.72 AT&T alleged that by
sending Windows to foreign manufacturers, Microsoft supplied for
combination abroad, "components" of AT&T's patented speech
processor. 73 Accordingly, AT&T contended Microsoft was liable for
infringement under section 271 (f). 7 4 Microsoft responded by arguing that
because unincorporated software is intangible information, it does not
qualify as a "component" of an invention under section 271 (). 75 Further,
Microsoft contended that the foreign-generated copies of Windows
65. Microsoft, 127 S. Ct. at 1761.
66. Brief of Respondent at 7-8, Microsoft, 127 S. Ct. 1746 (2007) (No. 05-1056), 2007 WL
186523.
67. Id. at 8.
68. Id. at 7-8.
69. Id.at 7. AT&T also secured patents for its speech processor in Canada, France, Germany,
Great Britain, Japan, and Sweden. Microsoft, 127 S. Ct. at 1759 n.17.
70. U.S. Patent No. 4,472,832 (filed Dec. 1, 1981). The speech processor at issue contained
software that enhanced the sound quality of synthesized speech while maintaining high data
compression. Brief for Respondent at 7, Microsoft, 127 S. Ct. 1746 (2007) (No. 05-1056), 2007 WL
186523.
71. Id. at 7.
72. Microsoft, 127 S. Ct. at 1753.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
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installed abroad were not supplied from the United States under section
271(f).7 6

Microsoft, as part of its Windows operating system software, included
programs that used embedded code covered by AT&T's patent when
combined with a computer." Microsoft and AT&T stipulated that the
Windows operating system contained software enabling a computer to
process speech in the manner claimed by AT&T's patent.78 However, as
the apparatus was claimed, uninstalled Windows software did not infringe
AT&T's patent.79 The same was true for a computer standing alone.80
Instead, AT&T's patent was infringed only when a computer was installed
with Windows, and thereby capable of functioning as the patented speech
processor." Further, Microsoft stipulated that by installing Windows on
its own computers during the software development process, it directly
infringed the patent in question. 2 Microsoft also acknowledged that by
licensing copies of Windows to manufacturers of computers sold in the
United States, it induced infringement of AT&T's patent.8 3 However,
Microsoft denied any liability based on the golden masters and electronic
transmissions it dispatched for foreign installation that did not enter the
U.S. market.84 Microsoft and AT&T agreed that, for the purposes of this
litigation, a foreign-manufactured computer containing the Windows
code
85
would violate AT&T's patent if imported into the United States.
Rejecting Microsoft's responses, the district court held Microsoft liable
for infringing AT&T's patent under section 271 (f).86 Afterward, Microsoft
and AT&T entered into a negotiated settlement agreement preserving
Microsoft's right to appeal and stipulating damage liability pending the
outcome of any appeals. On appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the

76. Id.
77. Microsoft, 127 S. Ct. at 1750.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 1753.
82. Microsoft, 127 S. Ct. at 1753. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (providing that "whoever without
authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention, within the United States or
imports into the United States any patented invention during the term of the patent therefor,
infringes the patent").
83. Microsoft, 127 S. Ct. at 1753. See 35 U.S.C. § 271 (b) (providing that "[w]hoever actively
induces infringement of a patent shall be liable as an infringer").
84. Microsoft, 127 S. Ct. at 1753.
85. Id. at 1761 (Alito, J., concurring as to all but footnote 14).
86. Id. at 1753 (majority opinion).
87. Brief of Respondent at 11, Microsoft, 127 S. Ct. 1746 (2007) (No. 05-1056), 2007 WL
186523. Microsoft would have been liable for royalties on every foreign copy of Windows sold
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Federal Circuit, a divided panel affirmed the district court's ruling.88
Subsequently, the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider two
specific issues.8 9
The first issue before the Supreme Court was whether Microsoft's
infringement liability extended to the computers installed with Windows
operating system software copied abroad from golden masters or
electronic transmissions dispatched by Microsoft. 9° In other words, the
Supreme Court was faced with determining the applicability of section
271 (f) in the context of computer software exported from the United States
on golden master disks or by electronic transmission, and specifically
whether, or in what form, software qualified as a component under section
271(f).9 1

As to which subsection of section 271 (f) AT&T's claim invoked, the
record was unclear. While sections 271(f)(1) and (f)(2) differ, neither
Microsoft nor AT&T suggested that the differences were outcome
determinative.92 Section 271(f) applied to the supply abroad of
"components of a patented invention, where such components are
uncombined in whole or in part, in such manner as to actively induce the
combination of such components." 93 Thus, the provision applies only to
"such components" as are combined into the patented invention at issue,
specifically AT&T's speech-processing computer.'
First the Court addressed the fundamental nature of software, namely
"the 'set of instructions, known as code, that directs a computer to perform
specified functions or operations."' 95 According to the majority, software
could be conceptualized in two ways. Software in abstract form consists
of disembodied code. 96 Until it is expressed on a tangible medium as a
computer readable copy, the code remains uncombinable and cannot be

until 2001 and experts estimated that Microsoft's potential liability was over one billion dollars if
it lost. Shaheen Pasha, Microsoft and Ma Bell in Supreme CourtDuel, CNNMONEY.COM (2007),
http://money.cnn.com/2007/02/16/news/companies/scotusmicrosoft/index.htm.
88. AT&T Corp. v. Microsoft Corp., 414 F.3d 1366, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
89. Microsoft, 127 S. Ct. at 1753-54.
90. See id. at 1755.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 1754 n.7. For the purposes of its analysis, the Supreme Court addressed only 25
U.S.C. § 271(f)(1). Id.
93. 35 U.S.C. § 271(f).
94. Microsoft, 127 S. Ct. at 1755.
95. Id. at 1754 (quoting Fantasy Sports Properties, Inc. v. Sportsline, Inc., 287 F.3d 1108,
1118 (Fed. Cir. 2002)).
96. Id.
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installed or executed on a computer.97 Alternatively, abstract software
could be reduced to a tangible medium.98 AT&T reasoned that software in
the abstract, rather than a particular copy of software, qualifies as a
"component" under section 271 (f). 99 AT&T took the position that because
encoding software onto a computer-readable medium is routine, this step
should not play a decisive role in determining liability under section
271(f)."° Conversely, Microsoft urged that only tangible copies of
software could be "components.'' °
The Supreme Court deduced that if Windows in the abstract qualified
as a component within section 271(f), the fact that the actual golden
masters were not installed abroad as working parts of the foreign
computers would be irrelevant.'0 2 While the Federal Circuit relied on the
prior decision in Eolas Technologies Inc. v. Microsoft Corp.,"°3 which held
that software qualifies as a component under section 271 (f), the Supreme
Court was unable to determine whether the Federal Circuit regarded
software in the abstract or a tangible copy of the software as the
"component."' 4
Alternatively, the Supreme Court reasoned that if only tangible
software could comprise a component and the relevant components are the
copies of Windows actually installed on the computer, AT&T could not
persuasively argue that those components, generated abroad, were supplied
from the United States, as required for liability under section 271 (f). 5 By
this construction, the copies of Windows on the master disks and
electronic transmissions that Microsoft sent from the United States could
not serve as a basis for liability because
they were not actually installed on
06
computers.1
manufactured
foreign
the
The Court concluded that a tangible copy of Windows software, rather
than Windows software in the abstract, qualified as a "component" under
section 27 1(f).'0 7 The Court pointed out that the extra step of reducing
software to a tangible computer readable medium renders the software a

97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

Id. at 1755.
Id. at 1754.
See Microsoft, 127 S. Ct. at 1755.
Id.at 1756.
See id. at 1754.
Id.
399 F.3d 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
Id.at 1341.
Microsoft, 127 S. Ct. at 1754.
Id. at 1754 n.9.
See id. at 1755-56.
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usable, combinable part of a computer.'0 8 Consequently, the majority
found that abstract software code is an idea without a physical
embodiment, and as such, does not qualify as a component amenable to
combination under section 271 (f). 0 9 The Court refused to reach the issue
of whether any other intangible element can ever qualify as a component
under section 271(f).1 1°
After determining that only software reduced to a tangible computer
readable medium could qualify as a "component" under section 271 (f), the
Supreme Court addressed the interrelated question of whether Microsoft
in fact supplied "components" of the foreign manufactured computers
from the United States."' According to the Court, a conventional reading
of section 271(f) required the question to be answered in the negative
because the copies of Windows installed on the computers were created
abroad, and, thus supplied, from outside the United States.11 2 Below
Federal Circuit majority opined that, in the case of software components,
the act of replication was subsumed in the act of supplying and observed
that a golden master was easily, inexpensively, and swiftly replicated
abroad.' 13 Hence, the Federal Circuit concluded that sending a single copy
of Windows abroad with intent that it be replicated invoked section 271 (f)
liability for the foreign-made copies." 4
Again, the Supreme Court noted that the copies of the Windows
operating system actually installed on the computers were not directly
supplied from the United States.1 5 The installation copies of Windows did
not exist until third parties outside the United States generated them from
the golden masters." 6 Relying on the fact that section 271(f) does not
address the act of copying in any context, the majority determined such
absence of copying in the statutory text weighed against an interpretation
117
that replication abroad was subsumed within the scope of section 271 (f).
Because Microsoft did not export from the United States the copies of
Windows actually installed, the Supreme Court found that the software
installed on the relevant computers was not supplied from the United

108. Id.at 1755

109. See id.
110. Microsoft, 127 S. Ct. at 1756 n.13.
111. Id.at 1756.

112. Id.
113. AT&T Corp v. Microsoft Corp, 414 F.3d 1366, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
114. Id.
115. Microsoft, 127 S. Ct. at 1757.

116. Id.
117. Id.
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States."i8 Therefore, Microsoft was not liable for infringement under 35
U.S.C. § 271(f).1 19

In a final policy argument, AT&T contended that construing section
271 (f) to cover only those copies of software actually dispatched from the
United States created a loophole for software makers. 120 Liability for
infringing a U.S. patent could be avoided by simply generating installation
copies of software abroad from a golden master supplied from the United
States. 121 While the Federal Circuit found AT&T's plea compelling, the
Supreme Court declined the opportunity for an expansive
interpretation
122
and instead left the issue for Congress to consider.
The Supreme Court resolved any doubt that Microsoft's conduct fell
outside the ambit of section 271(f) through a presumption against
extraterritoriality. 123 The Court recognized an axiom of patent law which
holds that no infringement occurs when a patented product is made and
sold in another country.124 The lone exception to the rule is section 271 (f),
which attaches infringement liability when components of a patented
invention are supplied for combination abroad. 125 Applied to the
circumstances at issue, the presumption strongly favored a restrictive
construction of section 271(f), encompassing only the golden masters
directly exported from the United States.'26 The Supreme Court asserted
foreign law alone, not U.S. law, governs the manufacture and sale of

118. Id.
119. See id. at 1759-60.
120. Microsoft, 127 S. Ct. at 1759.
121. Id.
122. AT&T Corp v. Microsoft Corp, 414 F.3d 1366, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2005). The Federal
Circuit majority stated,

[w]ere we to hold that Microsoft's supply by the exportation of the master
versions of the Windows software-specifically for the purpose of foreign
replication-avoids infringement, we would be subverting the remedial nature of
§ 271 (f), permitting a technical avoidance of the statute by ignoring the advances
in a field of technology-and its associated industry practices-that developed
after the enactment of § 271 (f) ... Section 271 (f), if it is to remain effective, must
therefore be interpreted in a manner that is appropriate to the nature of the
technology at issue.
Id. at 1371.
123. Microsoft, 127 S.Ct. at 1758.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
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components of patented inventions in foreign countries.12 7 Consequently,
if AT&T desired to prevent the manufacture of its apparatus in foreign
28
countries, its sole remedy is to obtain and enforce foreign patents.
While the Court acknowledged that plausible arguments exist for
extending section 271(f) to the conduct at issue, the Court resisted
expanding section 271(f) beyond its textual scope and left Congress the
discretion to amend the terms of section 271 (f) to account for emerging
technologies. 29 Moreover, the Court assumed that legislators take account
of the legitimate sovereign interests and concerns of extraterritorial
application when drafting laws. 30 Responding to the Deepsouth loophole,
Congress did not address other gaps in patent protection.' 3 ' For example,
section 271 (f) does not identify as an infringing act conduct in the United
States supplying information, instructions, or other materials for making
copies abroad. 3 2 Accordingly, the Supreme Court deferred to the
legislature any adjustment to patent law better taking into account the
practical realities of software distribution.' 33 Any such amendment should
be subjected to focused legislative consideration, and not achieved through
judicial forecasting of Congress's disposition.' 34
B. The ConcurringOpinion
In a separate concurring opinion, three justices emphasized components
under section 271(f) must be something physical.'35 According to the
concurring justices, the word "component," when concerning a physical
device was most naturally read to mean a physical part of the device.'36 As
'
a result, software did not qualify as a component under section 271 (f). 37
Further, the concurring justices reasoned that section 271 (f) requires
that a component be combined with other components to form the
infringing device, meaning the component must permanently remain a part
of the infringing apparatus.' 3 8 In the circumstances at issue, the Windows

127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

Id. at 1759.
Microsoft, 127 S. Ct. at 1759.
Id.
Id. at 1758-59.
Id. at 1759-60.
Id.
Microsoft, 127 S. Ct. at 1760.
Id.
Id. at 1761 (Roberts, Alito, Thomas, & Breyer, JJ., concurring). Id. at 1760.
Id.at 1761.
Id.
Microsoft, 127 S. Ct. at 1761.
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operating system software was recorded in a physical form in the magnetic
fields on the computers' hard drives once the installation process was
completed.' 39 No physical part of the master disks was ever physically
incorporated, permanently or temporarily, in the computers. 4 ' Because the
physical incarnation of software on the Windows master disks was not a
"component" of an infringing device under section 271(f), it logically
followed that copies of the master disks likewise did not qualify as
components. 4
Lastly, because no physical object originating in the United States was
combined with the foreign-manufactured computers, the concurring
justices determined there was no violation of section 271(f). 42
Correspondingly, the concurring justices believed it was irrelevant whether
the Windows software was installed onto the foreign-manufactured
computers directly from the golden masters or directly from an electronic
transmission originating from the United States. 43 However, they also
hypothesized that if the computers could not run the Windows operating
system without inserting and keeping a golden master containing the
software in the appropriate drive, then the golden master might qualify as
a component of the computer.'" For these reasons, the concurring justices
concluded that software, whether in the abstract or fixed in a tangible
medium, did not qualify as a component under section 271 (f).' 45
C. The DissentingOpinion
A lone dissenting justice embraced AT&T's arguments and was
persuaded that affirming the Federal Circuit's decision was faithful to the
congressional intent of section 271 (f). 146 The dissent recognized software,
whether attached or detached from any medium, as plainly satisfying the
dictionary definition of the term "component.' ' 47 Moreover, while the
majority avoided addressing the individual subsections of section 271 (f),
the dissent noticed that section 271(f)(2) best supported AT&T's

139. Id. at 1762.
140. Id.The concurring justices acknowledged that such an occurrence would be contrary to
the general workings of computers. Id.
141. Id.at 1762.
142. Id.
143. Microsoft, 127 S. Ct. at 1762.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.(Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
147. Id.at 1763.
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position. 48 Under that subsection, the export of an especially designed
component having no use other than as part of a patented apparatus
constitutes infringement. 49 In the dissent's view, the Windows operating
system was not a staple article or commodity suitable for substantial
noninfringing uses under section 271(f)(1).'5 To the contrary, its sole
intended use was for infringing purposes. 5 ' Therefore, according to the
a component of an infringing
dissent, the Windows software comprised
52
(f)(2).1
271
section
under
apparatus
V. STATUS OF §

271(f): CHANGING THE JUDICIAL COURSE OF
SOFTWARE COMPONENTS

The Microsoft decision is an example of that most uncommon legal
situation where the judiciary is forced to choose, not between good or bad,
silly or serious, law or physics, but rather between two equally reasonable
positions. Nevertheless, Microsoft was a truly rare occurrence in patent
law. Microsoft and AT&T advanced equally cogent arguments in favor of
their respective positions. Judging from the numerous amicus briefs on
either side, reasonable minds differed as to the specific questions before
the court.
Paramount before the Court were questions of basic statutory
construction, specifically whether, or in what form, software fell within the
scope of the term "component" of section 271 (f), and whether Microsoft's
conduct was within the meaning of "supplying or causing to be
supplied."' 53 The Supreme Court answered both in a restrictive fashion,
thus continuing its recent trend of retracting the scope of patent protection.
For instance, in eBay, the Supreme Court discarded the practice of
automatically granting permanent injunctions in successful patent
infringement cases, and instituted a more traditional four-factor test similar
to that for granting other injunctions. 54 Further, the Supreme Court in
MedImmune exposed licensed patents to potential invalidation by licensees
via the Declaratory Judgment Act without requiring the licensee to
materially breach the license agreement, again restricting the scope of

148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

Microsoft, 127 S.Ct. at 1763.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Microsoft, 127 S.Ct at 1753-54.
Supra text accompanying note 12.

2008]

MICROSOFT CORP. v. AT&T CORP.: AMPUTATING THE LONG ARM OF PATENT LA W

167

protection afforded by patents.'5 5 Finally, the Supreme Court in KSR
rejected the rigid "teaching-suggestion-motivation" non-obviousness test
in the case of patents combining elements of preexisting inventions,
instead opting for a flexible fact intensive inquiry, thereby raising the bar
56
of non-obviousness and subjecting patents to easier invalidation.1
Each of the three above mentioned cases lessened the scope of
protection afforded by patents, albeit in different manners. In Microsoft,
the Supreme Court declined to extend the extraterritorial reach of patent
law to software incorporated in a patented apparatus overseas.'5 7 In doing
so the Court deferred such an extension to the legislature, which could
presumably amend section 271(f) and enlarge the scope of the term
"component" to include certain software elements, either in abstract or
tangible form.'58
Deferring such an extension to the legislature, the Supreme Court
reversed the direction of patent case law in regard to software components
under section 271 (f). Prior to Microsoft, litigants successfully argued for
the gradual extension of section 271 (f), eventually reaching the point
where software was deemed a "component" under the statute. In Union
Carbide Chemicals & Plastics Technology Corp. v. Shell Oil Co. the
Federal Circuit clarified the then existing interpretation of section 271 (f),
finding that method claims possessed components, which include elements
used in practicing the method.'59 In that case, the component was a specific
compound used in a patented chemical process. Thus, a defendant could
be liable under section 271(f) for exporting a stock chemical if it was
intended for use in a manner infringing the patent if conducted in the
United States.16 To the contrary, in BayerA G v. Housey Pharms.,Inc., the
Federal Circuit held that a "component under § 271 (g) does not apply to
the importation of intangible information.' 6 ' Similarly, the Federal Circuit
in Pellegrini v. Analog Devices held that a "component" under section

155. Supra text accompanying notes 14-15.
156. Supra text accompanying notes 16-17.
157. Microsoft, 127 S. Ct. at 1760.
158. Id.at 1756.
159. Union Carbide Chems. & Plastics Tech. Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 425 F.3d 1366, 1379
(Fed. Cir. 2005) (stating that components of every form of invention are protected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 271(f), and that "components" and "patented inventions" under § 271 (f)are not limited to
physical machines) (citing Eolas Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp).
160. Id. Union Carbide sued Shell, a direct competitor, alleging infringement of its patent
related to silver catalysts for the commercial production of ethylene oxide. Id. at 1369-70.
161. Bayer AG v. Housey Pharms., Inc., 340 F.3d 1367, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (stating that
nothing in the legislative history suggesting that Congress was concerned that the preexisting
statutory scheme failed to reach intangible information).
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plans or instructions relating to a
271(f) does not include the export of
62
abroad.
manufactured
patented item
Subsequently, in Eolas Technologies Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., the
Federal Circuit found that transmitting computer code abroad could create
liability under section 271(f) as a "component" of a patented invention
"supplied" from the United States.'63 Judge Rader authored the Federal
Circuit opinion in Eolas holding that section 271(f) applies to golden
master sales overseas and that copying is subsumed within the term
"supply" for the purposes of software, based on its replicable nature." 6
The basic rationale was that software code is the essential part of a
computer, and therefore, must be regarded as a component.1 65 Strangely
enough, Judge Rader was commended by the Supreme Court majority in
Microsoft for his dissent at the Federal Circuit level, but the Court
overlooked the fact that he also authored the opinion in Eolas advocating
the contrary position."6
It is often overlooked that a component under section 271(f) need not
be patentable or statutory subject matter. In fact, this principle was the
basis of section 271 (f) and the legislative reaction to Deepsouth. Patented
inventions are often comprised of many parts that are individually
unpatentable. For example, a gear or switch is not patentable, but may
comprise a component of a patentable system. No one defending liability
under section 271(f) would argue that the gears of a machine are not
"components" simply because they are anticipated or obvious. Similarly,
in Microsoft, the software at issue was not patented. 67 AT&T's patent
68
claimed an apparatus programmed to execute a specific process.'
Consequently, arguments in Microsoft regarding the patentability of
software in the abstract are misplaced.
Of course, Microsoft wanted to avoid liability for infringing the U.S.
patent for its conduct abroad and gave two separate reasons why the export
of the Windows operating system software fell outside the ambit of section

162. Pellegrini v. Analog Devices, Inc., 375 F.3d 1113, 1118 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (holding that
the transmission abroad of instructions for producing patented computer chips not covered by §
271(0).
163. Eolas Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 399 F.3d 1325, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (holding that
the language and history of § 271(f), as well as the Federal Circuit law protecting software
inventions, support a finding that software code on golden master disks fall within the meaning of
the term "component" in § 271(0).
164. Id. at 1339-40.
165. Id.at 1339.
166. See Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 127 S. Ct. 1746, 1756-57 (2007).
167. See id.at 1753.
168. Id.
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271(0. First, Microsoft argued that software code is intangible69
information, and, therefore, not a "component" under the statute.
Second, Microsoft urged that, because copies of Windows were used to
create the patented apparatus, no physical particle Microsoft exported
actually became a permanent part of the assembled apparatus. 170 Thus,
nothing in the infringing apparatus
was actually supplied from the United
17 1
States as required by the statute.
The distinction a court draws between abstract software and a tangible
copy is somewhat strained. The statute does not spell out a tangibility
requirement. 172 This being said, Microsoft did not export abstract
information. It exported tangible copies of the software embodied on the
golden master.173 Perhaps what the Supreme Court meant was that the
material stored on the golden master disk was abstract, intangible
information that was incapable of classification as a component. Only the
disk containing the Windows operating system was potentially a
component, but was disqualified as such because it did not become a
permanent part of the computer. Meanwhile, the intangible information on
the disk is transferred to the computer. If this were the case, Microsoft
would escape section 27 1(f) liability if it individually exported each copy
of Windows for direct installation onto the foreign manufactured
computers.
The tangibility requirement also breaks down when mechanics of a
computer are examined at an operational scale. Software does not exist
unless it is embodied in some medium, and computers cannot function off
of "disembodied software" as the Court seems to imply. Electrical signals,
which include stationary magnetic fields on a computer's hard disk, may
comprise that medium. Electrical signals are generally manifested by
drifting electrons and by electromagnetic force lines emanating from those
"real" compositions of matter. Accordingly, information represented by
software is not abstract. It is real, and concrete, and it exists in physical
form. It is not an abstract notion, but a real and tangible mechanism
triggering specific functions within a computer. The fact that software is
easily transferable via electrical impulses or photons does not change this
fact.
Moreover, computers only respond to software when it is embodied in
a physical signal. It is necessary for physical particles, such as electrons

169.
170.
171.
172.
173.

Id.at 1754 n.8.
See id.at 1757.
Microsoft, 127 S.Ct. at 1757.
See 35 U.S.C. § 271(f).
Microsoft, 127 S. Ct. at 1761.
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or photons, to move before the computer responds to the software, thereby
transferring the signaling energy into the computer and causing a real
physical change in the magnetic domains of the computer's hard drive and
a physical change in the trapped charge of the computer's flash memory.
Admittedly, while the export of software through a secure electronic
signal appears more likely to qualify as abstract information, that argument
also collapses upon closer examination. Real, tangible signals were used
to record the signal in the master disk and real tangible signals were used
to transfer the software from the master disk to the foreign manufactured
computers. Similarly, a sinusoidal 120 volt AC signal is present in your
nearest outlet. It can yield real, tangible, and concrete results if one is
inclined to investigate.
Addressing whether Microsoft supplied "components" of the foreign
made computers the United States pursuant to section 271 (f), the Supreme
Court employed a molecular conservation approach.174 The plain language
of the statute requires that inducing foreign combination constitutes
infringement only if the assembled components are the exact same
components exported from the United States.'75 Conduct that merely
induces the combination of foreign made components does not violate
section 271 (f). 176 Supplying exact copies of the components is insufficient
under the statute. 177 Thus, the statute arguably leaves foreign
manufacturers free to fabricate and assemble identical components
overseas, so long as none of the components were made within the United
States.
Furthermore, under a strict application of the molecular conservation
requirement, as adopted by the concurring opinion, no infringement would
occur even if the golden masters were directly installed on the foreign
computers. 178 During the installation process there is no physical transfer
of molecules or electrons from the installation disk to the hard drive. The
installation disk generates an electrical signal, which after processing
applies a magnetic field to the surface of the computer's hard drive and
changes the magnetic orientation of molecules in the hard drive. The
configuration of pits and lands existing on the installation disk were not
removed and added to the hard drive, but were merely translated and
recreated on the hard disk, leaving the installation disk undisturbed.
Because the installation disk is merely a template to configure another

174.
175.
176.
177.
178.

See id.at 1756-57.
Id.at 1757.
See id.
See id. at 1756-57.
Microsoft, 127 S. Ct. 1757 n.14.
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device that is removed after the installation process, it is best characterized
as a tool for creating the Windows operating system on the finished
computers. The same would be true if the golden masters were installed,
rather than the foreign generated copies.
However, the installation of software does change the configuration of
atoms and molecules on the hard drive, which represent ones and zeroes
of binary code. Thus, one can feasibly argue that installing Windows onto
the hard drive of a computer changes the configuration thereof and
becomes a physical part of the molecular structure ofthe apparatus. If such
configuration of atoms and molecules are removed from the hard drive, the
computer becomes inoperable and is only functionally useful as a
paperweight. Perhaps Justice Stevens expressed the more convincing view
in his dissent stating, "if a disk with software inscribed on it is a
'component,' I find it difficult to understand why the most important
1' 79
ingredient of that component is not also a component."
In its brief AT&T aptly pointed out that if Microsoft Windows were
installed on a computer within the United States by any method, it would
infringe AT&T's patent, the type of conduct section 271(f) specifically
sought to address.' 80 Therefore, the export of golden masters with the sole
purpose of replication for assembly falls squarely within the scope of
section 271 (f)(2). Microsoft's intent is evidenced by collection of licensing
royalties on every installed copy of Windows.' 8 ' Knowing the golden
master was specially designed and adapted, Microsoft intended that the
software embodied on the golden master would ultimately be combined
into the patented invention. But arguably the Patent Law Amendments Act
of 1984 was never intended to capture millions of infringing acts based on
the supply of a single "component."
Not surprisingly, Microsoft previously acknowledged in a different
arena that the number of golden masters it sends abroad does not limit the
number of units supplied. In Microsoft Corp. v. Commissionerof Internal
Revenue, Microsoft argued that it was entitled to tax deductions for all
foreign sales of software replicated from the golden masters abroad.'82
Microsoft claimed that such copies were "export property" under the

179. Id. at 1763.
180. See Brief for Respondent at 32-33, Microsoft, 127 S. Ct. 1746 (2007).
181. Id. at2.
182. Microsoft Corp. v. Comm'r ofInternal Revenue, 311 F.3d 1178, 1181-82 (9th Cir. 2002)
(holding that Microsoft's tax deduction for "export property" applied not only to the physical disks
exported from the United States, but to all "royalties that Microsoft earned" from licenses to foreign
manufacturers, including the "royalty for each copy of the [software] distributed in the market or
for each computer system the [manufacturers] sold").
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statute. 83 The Ninth Circuit agreed with Microsoft that all copies created
from the golden master were export property.'
The distinction the Supreme Court draws in analyzing the supply issue
is that the golden masters were shipped directly from the United States,
while the copies of Windows used for installation on the foreign
manufactured computers were not. 85 Indeed, if the Court decided that
abstract software qualified as a component under section 271(f), any
export intending that Windows be installed on millions of foreign
manufactured computers would attach liability. Consequently, the
Supreme Court had no choice but to find the golden master as containing
software in the abstract, and therefore outside the scope of section 271 (f).
The Supreme Court buttressed its determination that only software
reduced to a tangible medium qualifies as a component through a
molecular conservation requirement. This allowed the Court to limit
section 271 (f) liability to a specific point in the supply chain. Microsoft's
distribution methodology allowed it to compartmentalize the supply
process, resulting in a finding that Microsoft supplied from the United
States only the golden master disks. The practical realities of the supply
and distribution process were awkwardly cast aside.
Upon deciding that only tangible software may qualify as a component,
the Court was forced to define the limits of Microsoft's supply process.
Microsoft successfully argued that replication is part of the assembly
process, rather than being included in the supply process. 86 But wrestling
over where the supply process ends and the assembly process begins is
akin to arguing where a circle begins. The replication process might more
appropriately fall within the language "or causing to be supplied" in
section 271(f)(2). Nonetheless, it is difficult to fathom that whether
software is deemed a component of a patented invention turns on an
inquiry asking whether several copies of the software are made from one
disk or several disks are used to create one copy each.
Conceptually more interesting than the question of whether Microsoft
supplied "components" of the foreign made computers the United States
pursuant to section 271(f) is the issue of where in the supply chain to
define components. Should the analysis follow the typical manufacturing
process and follow components forward in toward combination in the
potentially infringing product? Alternatively, should the analysis begin
with the finished product and sequentially divide the final assemblage into
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components? Do the different approaches yield different outcomes?
Further, are subcomponents considered components of the finished
product? At what scale do individual parts cease to be components?
V. IMPLICATIONS OF MICROSOFT v. A T& T

A. ExtraterritorialReach of U.S. Patent Law
International patents do not exist. Instead, patent law is restricted, with
few exceptions, to the territory of the sovereign granting the patent.'87
Hence, a U.S. patent covers infringing acts occurring in the United States
and its territories, but generally disregards extraterritorial activities. 88 The
lone exception is section 271(f), which expands the territorial scope of
U.S. patent protection by creating liability for exporting "components" of
a patented invention so that the invention may be assembled and practiced
abroad. 89
In the economics of modem business, section 271 (f) is nearly irrelevant
with respect to manufacturing. Because of lower production costs in
foreign countries, physical components are rarely exported from the
United States for assembly elsewhere. However, the United States
continues to lead the world in developing and exporting software through
Microsoft and other software giants. Naturally, Microsoft does not
distribute its software by manufacturing millions of CDs domestically and
loading them onto a cargo ship. Instead, Microsoft creates relatively few
copies of golden masters and ships them to foreign manufacturers for
replication and installation.190
Strangely enough, Microsoft's arguments before the Supreme Court
implicitly advocated the weakening of software patents in the United
States. Microsoft is perhaps the single software company that does not
need extraterritorial protection of its software patents. Compared to all
other software development companies, Microsoft can best afford
procuring and enforcing foreign patents, while others may lack the
necessary resources. In the existing market structure, Microsoft possesses
the capacity to pillage and plunder the patents of smaller companies
simply by exporting software components for foreign replication. In this
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Id. at 1758.
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35 U.S.C. § 271(f).
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case, Microsoft was serendipitously able to align its interests in both
winning the case at bar and undermining software patents at the same time.
The consequence of finding liability for Microsoft would have driven
the software development industry offshore to assure that "components"
are never exported, thereby avoiding any future infringement under section
271(f). Software developers would be forced into paying royalties for
software they reproduced and sold abroad. Such a mutation of patent law
would prevent the export of software without the payment of royalties.
This would place the domestic software development industry at a
significant disadvantage in relation to foreign software developers in
markets overseas. This potential was raised in several amicus briefs and
buttressed by the principle that patent protection was intended to
encourage domestic innovation, as opposed to driving it overseas.'91
However, by negatively answering whether software constitutes a
"component" under section 271 (f), the Supreme Court opened another
Deepsouth loophole for circumventing patent law. An infringer can simply
select a foreign manufacturing location in a country where the patentee
lacks protection and upload software from the United States for replication
and assembly into the patented apparatus. Likewise, this loophole
effectively kills protection for Internet software patents. A potential
infringer can simply locate a server in any territory where patent protection
was not sought, or in a territory not recognizing software patents.

191. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 25, Microsoft,
127 S. Ct. at 1746 (urging that the court of appeals' interpretation of§ 271(f) frustrates the goal of
a technology-neutral statutory scheme, and under that approach, the software industry alone is
regulated in a manner that differs significantly from the fundamental balance struck by Congress,
which prohibits the manufacture of components in the United States while permitting it abroad);
Brief for Shell Oil Company as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 3, Microsoft, 127 S. Ct.
at 1746 (stating that the Federal Circuit's judgment, if upheld, would adversely affect the software
industry, as well as every company and industry operating domestically and supplying materials
for use in processes performed by overseas customers); Brief for the Business Software Alliance
as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 7, Microsoft, 127 S. Ct. at 1746 (arguing that the Federal
Circuit's creation of liability that Congress did not intend will have a profound impact both on the
companies now faced with potentially limitless exposure and on the U.S. economy as a whole, and
threatens the competitive viability of an industry that receives on average 50% of its revenues from
foreign sales). See also Brief for Bayhdole25, Inc. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at
4, Microsoft, 127 S. Ct. at 1746 (arguing that the judgment of the Federal Circuit should not be
reversed because the precedent would have a harmful effect on the biotechnology industry).
Ironically, a Microsoft victory would have been quite unsettling for its employees in the United
States. Microsoft would have likely relocated thousands ofjobs in the software development sector
to foreign countries. Accordingly, such a victory would be bittersweet for Microsoft employees.
Winning a legal argument is of little comfort when standing with your colleagues in the
unemployment line.
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Because section 271 (f) no longer applies to the export of software
elements, patentees must take appropriate protective measures.
Consequently, the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT) will assume a more
prominent role in protecting inventions containing software elements.
Whereas filing for protection concurrently in multiple jurisdictions
through the PCT was prudent for all classes of inventions, it is an
absolutely necessary practice for inventions containing software elements
after Microsoft. By utilizing the Patent Cooperation Treaty, the inventor
may easily seek patent protection in multiple countries through a
centralized administrative structure. 192 Nevertheless, the invention must
satisfy each respective country's criteria for patentability. 93
After obtaining foreign patents through the use of the Patent
Cooperation Treaty, the inventor can then enforce the corresponding patent
rights in each nation. With respect to protecting inventions with software
elements, the only limitation is the policy of a foreign nation in
recognizing the patentability of software. While obtaining patent
protection in multiple nations may initially impede the efforts of potential
infringers, they may still relocate to countries not recognizing software
under their patent system.
Notably, the outcome in Microsoft likely pleased other nations by
evidencing that the United States is not willing to infringe on their
sovereignty with respect to patent policy. If section 271(f) covered
software as "components," U.S. patent law would partially frustrate efforts
of other countries to abolish patent protection of software. Additionally,
Microsoft creates an incentive for developing nations to exclude software,
or software elements, from patent protection. While intellectual property
protection is generally recognized as a tool for economic development,
excluding software from protection arguably results in greater economic
benefit for developing nations under the circumstances present in
Microsoft. Under this approach, developing nations would attract software
development and related manufacturing industries with an intellectual
property regime free of potential infringement liability.

192. See Patent Cooperation Treaty art. 4, June 19, 1970-Nov. 26, 1975,28 U.S.T. 7645, 1160
U.N.T.S. 231. The Patent Cooperation Treaty allows an inventor to seek patent protection
simultaneously in each of a large number of countries. About the Patent Cooperation Treaty,
http://www.wipo.int/pctlen/treaty/about.htm (last visited Aug. 22, 2007). Such an application under
the Patent Cooperation Treaty may generally be filed with the national patent office of the
Contracting State of which the applicant is a national or resident or with the International Bureau
of the World Intellectual Property Organization in Geneva. Id.
193. See Patent Cooperation Treaty art. 27, June 19, 1970-Nov. 26, 1975, 28 U.S.T. 7645,
1160 U.N.T.S. 231.
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B. FundamentalShift in DraftingClaimsfor Software Elements
Microsoft undoubtedly affects the strategy for drafting future patents
claiming inventions with software elements. Patent prosecutors will
attempt to close the section 271 (f) loophole opened in Microsoft through
shrewd drafting strategies. As always, a patent prosecutor always must be
mindful that patents do not protect the software code itself.94 Only the
function and utility of the software are protected.'95 Likewise, patents do
not protect algorithms, but can be used to claim the real world application
of an algorithm.'96 Claims directed toward software should articulate a
series of steps or functions performed through the use of software
elements. The standard is identical to claims for non-software inventions.
A patent should be issued so long as the steps or functions are new, useful,
and non-obvious. Indeed, one would be hard pressed to find a patent
concluding "I claim: software comprising .... "
Also, the patentability of hardware inventions is a long-settled
question. Therefore, claims for software elements should be drafted as
potentially implemented through hardware circuitry, although a software
version is preferred. If an inventor implements an invention through both
software and hardware, a patent should issue for either embodiment so
long as the basic requirements for patentability are satisfied. Similarly, one
can write software to achieve the same end in a large number of ways.
Ideally, the patent claims them all, even those never to be written or
constructed. In this sense, a software patent can cover a result, regardless
of how it was achieved.
After the Supreme Court's decision in Microsoft, future software
patents should include claims for a replicating system using a master disk
in order to potentially attach liability under section 271(f). The claimed
replication system would include a golden master, thereby rendering the
golden master a tangible component of the claimed replication system.
194. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (stating that "whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may
obtain a patent therefor..."). Inventions composed of software elements are nonetheless patentable
subject matter. See generallyArrhythmia Research Tech., Inc. v. Corazonix Corp, 958 F.2d 1053
(Fed. Cir. 1992) (holding that patent claims covering human heart electrocardiographic signal
analysis methods and apparatus, including software elements, were for statutory subject matter).
Software code is protected by copyright. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (stating that "original works of
authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later developed, from which
they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of
a machine or device" are copyrightable).
195. Arrhythmia, 958 F.2d at 1056-57. See also Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594-95 (1978)
(involving an improper attempt to patent a mathematical formula or algorithms in the abstract).
196. Id.
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Accordingly, section 271(f) would apply to the export and foreign
replication of the golden master. In the absence of claims directed to a
replication system, the master disk is not a part of a patented invention and
is a mere tool used to create the patented invention, similar to an electronic
lathe. Recall that the statute covers components especially made or
especially adapted for use in the patented invention-not implements used
to create patented inventions or their components.197
At first blush it appears that this drafting strategy would fail the
obviousness standard. However, dependent claims and multiple dependent
claims contain all the restrictions and elements of the claims on which they
depend. Thus, if an invention containing software elements is novel and
non-obvious, logic dictates that the replication of that invention is
necessarily novel and non-obvious if set forth in a dependent claim or
multiple dependent claim.
C. Other Applicability of Microsoft
Aside from application to patented inventions containing software, the
rationale present in Microsoft can be applied in a parallel fashion to other
emerging technologies. Microsoft likely affects the scope of protection
available for easily replicable inventions. Some examples include cell
lines, patented seeds, and DNA. The numerous amicus briefs suggest that
a variety of industries and businesses closely monitored this case.
Accordingly, the implications of the Microsoft decision may reach far
beyond the domestic software development industry.
The biotechnology industry is the most likely to feel the effect of the
Microsoft decision. At the most basic level DNA is comparable to
computer software because it is the embodiment of instructions for
building, operating, and replicating an organism. Apart from the debate on
whether it comprises patentable subject matter, DNA containing the
"instructions" at the heart of a patented invention, much like software, can
be easily exported and replicated for incorporation into an organism.
Therefore, any decision on the subject of software may potentially
manifest itself in this arena as well. If applicable to biotechnology, the
Microsoft ruling will certainly encourage development of intellectual
property dynamics similar to the software industry, allowing for the
international distribution of materials without royalty payments.

197. 35 U.S.C. § 271(0.
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The most probable circumstances to which the Microsoft rationale is
applicable involve exporting actual DNA or DNA sequences.'98 in
biotechnology, the finished product is typically a protein, which does not
contain DNA. Hence, the viral vector used to deliver the DNA is the
equivalent of a golden master. In each case the instructions contained
therein can be exported without infringing the claims of the related
invention. Also like software, no molecule of the vector's DNA is present
in the finished protein. Therefore, the export and replication of the DNA
or its sequence would not infringe the claims to the protein according to
Microsoft. As for cells that produce the proteins, their DNA is replicated
from DNA originally supplied through the viral or plasmid vectors.
Consequently, an organism subject to a U.S. patent and engineered abroad
using DNA or DNA sequences supplied from the United States is almost
entirely analogous to the circumstances presented in Microsoft.
In light of the similarities, the primary issue in applying the reasoning
of Microsoft is whether a set of instructions, either in the abstract, or in
tangible form, qualifies as a "component" under section 271 (f). The export
of the DNA sequence listing likely constitutes instructions in the abstract,
while the actual genetic material is a tangible set of instructions. Following
Microsoft, exporting DNA sequences might escape liability under section
271(f), while liability might attach for the export of actual genetic
material. Further, one escapes section 271 (f) liability because no exported
material is physically present in the finished product.
Justice Breyer realized the potential scope of applicability during oral
arguments and stated, "I would be quite frightened of deciding and then
discovering that all over the world there are vast numbers of inventions
that really can be thought of in the same way you're thinking of this one,
and suddenly all kinds of transmissions of information themselves and
alone become components. '99 However, given the resources invested in
genetic research, protein therapy, and other emerging biotechnology fields,
protecting the biological equivalent of "instructions" under some sort of
intellectual property regime is entirely reasonable. The chief stumbling
block is that neither the patent, nor the copyright statutes are well suited
for the task. Again, the question likely requires a legislative answer, rather
than judicial.
Also potentially implicated by Microsoft is the developing field of
nanotechnology. Instead of questions regarding abstract and tangible
198. Reconstructing full-length DNA from sequences is well within today's technology, as the
poliovirus genome was artificially created in 2002.
199. Transcript of Oral Argument at 43, Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 127 S. Ct. 1746
(2007).
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instruction, nanotechnology raises the issue of scale in regard to section
271(f) components. At what scale does section 271(f) become
inapplicable? At a small enough scale, might individual atoms or photons
constitute "components?" Again, these are issues for which the judiciary
and patent statutes are unprepared.
VI. CONCLUSION

Technology creates new capabilities for the public and new problems
for the judiciary. It is a rare occurrence indeed that judges possess a
thorough understanding of the emerging technologies before them.
Inevitably, the judge will demand an analogy, but analogies will always be
imperfect when describing emerging technologies. 2° Complicating matters
further, statutes almost always will be inadequate when interpreting them
in light of emerging technologies. To have a meaningful discussion and
decide issues soundly, all sides must have a proper understanding of the
issues, both technological and legal. Inevitably, section 271 (f) will be the
subject of further interpretation on account of developing technology and
creative patent drafting. It remains to be seen whether AT&T rushes to
Capitol Hill and lobbies for an amendment to section 271(f) and halts the
recession of patent law. If AT&T succeeds in this endeavor, equally as
compelling is the question of whether such legislation be upheld as
constitutionally valid.
In Microsoft, the federal judiciary continued its trend of weakening
patent protection in response to the previous improvident extension of
patent law. While confining the scope of infringing activities in regard to
software elements, the Supreme Court raised questions of even greater
technological difficulty but managed to sidestep them in this case. Luckily
for the Supreme Court, Microsoft and AT&T stipulated the most
controversial issues, the prime example being the validity of the patent at
issue. In this manner, Microsoft and AT&T limited the specific issues the
court could address.

200. One analogy raised was that of someone reading the text of a patent claim over the phone
to a person in a foreign country who then manufactured the patented product according to the
claims. By a similar analogy, Microsoft attempted to illustrate the abstract nature of software.
Microsoft compared its export of the Windows operating system to a situation in which one person
read the binary ones and zeroes of a software program over the phone to a person in a foreign
country. Contrary to the initial purpose of the analogy, it demonstrated another possible, though
tedious, method for physically transferring the tangible mechanism of the software from one
location to another.
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Despite the stipulations, Microsoft's petition impliedly argued that
software itself does not constitute patentable subject matter, a topic over
which much ink has been spilled. The Supreme Court never has ruled on
software patents as statutory subject matter and this issue remains to be
decided conclusively, as noted during oral arguments.2 ' Conspicuously,
the text of the opinion is couched in terms of copyright, as a significant
portion is devoted to whether the software was reduced to a tangible
medium.2" 2 Will the Supreme Court continue to retract the scope of patent
protection? Is software patentable? After Microsoft, there is no right
answer in the abstract. Only the Supreme Court can provide the answer,
which we must live with until the legislature amends the statute or the
Supreme Court changes its mind. In preparation for the imminent decision,
we should perhaps divide the world into 10 kinds of people: those who
count in binary and those who do not.

201. Transcript of Oral Argument at 22, Microsoft, 127 S. Ct. at 1746. Justice Breyer stated,
"I take it that we are operating under the assumption that software is patentable? We have never
held that in this Court, have we?"
202. Microsoft, 127 S. Ct. at 1754. See also 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (stating that "[c]opyright
protection subsists ... in original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression,
now known or later developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise
communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device").

